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Abstract
We employ a comprehensive linked employer-employee data set for Brazil to analyze wage determinants
and compare results to Abowd, Kramarz, Margolis and Troske (2001) for French and U.S. manufac-
turing. While returns to human capital variables in Brazilian manufacturing exceed those of the other
countries, occupation and gender di®erentials are similar. The worker characteristics component of
individual compensation accounts for much of the greater wage inequality in Brazil, but the establish-
ment-¯xed component has scant explanatory power. Thus, ¯rm- or industry-level factors have little
scope for explaining the di®erences in wage inequality. Brazil's wage structure closely resembles that
of France, a country with some similarity in labor-market institutions.
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1The structure of wages is a topic of central importance in labor and development economics. Empirical
research has tied wages closely to individual worker characteristics, including human capital and gender,
and has shown that industry- and ¯rm-level characteristics play important roles. Earnings inequality has
been broadly linked to these factors.
To avoid potentially serious omitted variable bias, recent work on wage structure has utilized linked
employer-employee panel data, which admit a full range of worker- and ¯rm-level controls. Considerable
progress has been made in exploiting such data sets to assess aspects of wage structure in industrialized
countries.1 Due to data limitations, however, far less attention has been paid to developing countries.2
This has restricted the evaluation of wage determination theories beyond the context of industrialized
economies. Moreover, many issues in labor market policy relate to the wage structure. In particular, the
relatively high wage inequality in developing countries is di±cult to evaluate in the absence of cross-country
information on wage structure determinants.
This paper examines the relationship between earnings, worker characteristics and ¯rm characteristics
in a developing country. We employ an extensive linked employer-employee data set for Brazil that is
directly comparable to data sets for France and the U.S., as studied by Abowd et al. (2001). The data
quality enables us to analyze compensation determinants, controlling for employer-¯xed e®ects and detailed
¯rm and worker characteristics. As far as we are aware, we report the ¯rst direct comparison of this kind
between developing and industrialized countries.
We draw on Brazil's establishment-worker data set Rela» c~ ao Anual de Informa» c~ oes Sociais, or RAIS.
This is an annual record of workers formally employed in any sector (agriculture, commerce, construction,
manufacturing, utilities, services and public), with demographic information for individual workers, along
with establishment identi¯ers. Beyond prior studies for developing countries, we estimate composite estab-
lishment-level ¯xed e®ects for a cross section of formally employed workers, and thereby capture unobserved
establishment-average worker characteristics along with unobserved establishment characteristics. This
allows us to evaluate the relationships between wages and observable worker characteristics, controlling
for otherwise unmeasured e®ects.
2Our primary purpose is to contrast the wage structure in Brazilian manufacturing in 1990 with that of
France in 1992 and the U.S. in 1990, as evaluated by Abowd et al. (2001). Our data permit the adoption
of those authors' exact statistical speci¯cation. The chosen reference year predates the implementation
of Brazil's extensive pre-competitive reforms in the early 1990s, thus limiting the role of transition e®ects.
To assess robustness, we also provide a set of results for 1997, a year that follows the transition period.3
We restrict our analysis to S~ ao Paulo state, the most economically advanced Brazilian state, as well
as the manufacturing center of the country. Given its similarity to mid-income developing countries, S~ ao
Paulo state provides a useful comparison of industrialized- versus developing-country wage determinants.4
Our data capture the wage structure in the formal labor market. As a robustness check, we assess potential
selectivity bias by predicting worker selection into our sample using complementary household data.
While past studies have compared returns to human capital in developing versus industrialized coun-
tries, ours is the ¯rst to provide a direct comparison based on linked employer-employee data. In line
with traditional studies, we ¯nd that wage premia associated with human capital measures are far higher
in Brazil than in France and the U.S. A typical male manufacturing worker in Brazil with at least some
college attendance receives wages that are 180 percent higher than a comparable worker with at least some
high-school education. This premium stands at 70 percent in the U.S., and in France it is only 60 percent.
We also ¯nd that returns to experience among men are considerably greater in Brazil. Because we include
establishment e®ects, these comparisons are robust to workforce sorting based on human capital and to
unmeasured workforce characteristics (such as average ability) at the establishment level. On the other
hand, we ¯nd that wage di®erentials based on occupation and gender are strikingly similar across the three
countries.
Brazilian earnings inequality, as measured by the standard deviation of log wages, is 44 percent higher
than in the U.S., and 90 percent higher than in France. Our estimated worker characteristics and
establishment-¯xed components of individual wages shed light on the overall importance of individual-
versus establishment-level factors in explaining this di®erence. In all three countries, the predicted
wages of manufacturing workers based on their observable characteristics play a dominant role in total
3compensation|amounting to between one-half and three-quarters of overall manufacturing wage vari-
ability. Establishment-¯xed e®ects, in contrast, have relatively little importance in explaining Brazilian
wages, in comparison to the other countries. Correspondingly, the variability of residual earnings, after
controlling for worker and establishment characteristics, is much greater in Brazilian manufacturing.5
It follows that Brazil's relatively high wage inequality cannot be traced to establishment-level factors,
including industry- and ¯rm-level variables. To the contrary, worker-level factors, both observable and
unobservable, account for the cross-country di®erences in earnings inequality. This ¯nding has direct
implications for theoretical models of wage determination, and renders employer-related explanations of
wage dispersion relatively less important.
We further consider the relationships between ¯rm characteristics and wages, using the manufactur-
ing survey PIA (Pesquisa Industrial Anual), which provides ¯rm-level input, output and performance
measures. Firm identi¯ers in the RAIS and PIA data sets permit the linking of ¯rm- and worker-level
observations. We show that ¯rm-average predicted worker characteristics and establishment-¯xed compo-
nents of wages, based on our estimates, each relate positively and signi¯cantly to ¯rm size, capital intensity,
occupational skill intensity, and workforce productivity in Brazilian manufacturing. Both workforce com-
position and unmeasured establishment-speci¯c factors are important in explaining the higher wages paid
by large, capital- and skill-intensive, and highly productive ¯rms. The relationships between wages and
¯rm characteristics are similar for Brazil and France, while the U.S. di®ers in important respects.
To assess the robustness of our results to the choice of sector, we replicate our analysis for three non-
manufacturing sectors|services, commerce and agriculture|in 1990. Broadly speaking, the services and
commerce sectors are similar to manufacturing regarding the relation between wages and individual char-
acteristics, and the relative importance of the worker-characteristics and establishment-¯xed components.
In agriculture, however, the returns to human capital are smaller, and the establishment-¯xed compo-
nent is signi¯cantly more important. Thus, the agriculture sector, while small, demonstrates important
di®erences with respect to wage determination.
The paper proceeds as follows. We discuss our main data sources RAIS (for worker and establishment
4information) and PIA (for manufacturing ¯rm information) in Section I, along with a complementary but
not linkable household survey used for selection correction. Section II describes the statistical models.
Section III presents results on Brazil's manufacturing wage structure in 1990 and 1997, and compares ¯nd-
ings to France in 1992 and the U.S. in 1990. Section IV reports a re-estimation of Brazil's manufacturing
wage structure controlling for formal-job selectivity, verifying the robustness of the results. Connections
between ¯rm characteristics and wage components are investigated in Section V. For the year 1990,
Section VI provides a comparison between manufacturing and non-manufacturing sectors. An extended
discussion is o®ered in Section VII, and Section VIII concludes.
I Data
We use comprehensive individual worker data with information on earnings, demographic characteristics
and occupations, along with establishment ID codes for the place of work. From a separate source we
obtain data on manufacturing ¯rms that describe numerous ¯rm-level characteristics. Firm-identifying
establishment IDs from the worker data set make it possible to link the worker and ¯rm observations. To
verify that our results are not a®ected by worker selectivity into formal employment, we obtain out-of-
sample predictions of employment status from a separate household survey.
Worker data. Our individual worker data derive from the labor force records RAIS (Rela» c~ ao Anual de
Informa» c~ oes Sociais of the Brazilian labor ministry MTE). By Brazilian law, every private or public-sector
employer must report detailed worker and job information to RAIS every year.6
A job observation in RAIS is uniquely identi¯ed by worker ID, the employer's establishment ID, and
dates of job accession and separation. The establishment ID makes it possible to control for unobservable
establishment and average-workforce e®ects in explaining the wage structure. For every worker, we keep
the observation with the highest paying job on December 31st. In the available version of RAIS, workers'
ages are reported in terms of eight age ranges. We exclude workers in the two highest ranges (50 years
and older) to avoid potential confounding e®ects stemming from workers who leave the labor force prior
5to the o±cial retirement age. We restrict attention to workers employed in S~ ao Paulo state in four private
sectors (agriculture, commerce, manufacturing and services) for the years 1990 and 1997. The resulting
samples consist of 5.89 million workers in 1990 and 6.37 million in 1997.
RAIS reports compensation as the monthly average wage, expressed in multiples of the current min-
imum wage. We use the log of annual wages as our earnings measure, de¯ned as the reported monthly
wage times the December U.S. dollar equivalent of the current minimum wage times 12. See Appendix A
for further details concerning the compensation measure.
We use the reported age ranges jointly with the nine reported education categories to obtain a proxy
for potential labor force experience. For example, a typical Early Career worker (34.5 years of age) who
is also a Middle School Dropout (left school at 11 years of age) is assigned 23.5 years of potential labor
force experience. Our education variable regroups the nine education categories included in RAIS to
correspond to the categories considered by Abowd et al. (2001).7 Appendix A provides further details on
the construction of our education and experience variables.
Occupational classi¯cations in RAIS follow the CBO (Classi¯ca» c~ ao Brasileira de Ocupa» c~ oes). To make
this system comparable to standard international classi¯cations, we mapped the CBO for 1994 into the
commonly-used ISCO-88 (International Standard Classi¯cation of Occupations, Muendler, Poole, Ramey
and Wajnberg (2004)). The ISCO-88 reclassi¯cations are in turn mapped into ¯ve broad occupational
categories (professional and managerial, technical and supervisory, other white collar, skill-intensive blue
collar, and other blue collar). These correspond to the categories that Abowd et al. (2001) use.8
Table 1 indicates the sectoral employment shares within the 1990 and 1997 samples. Agriculture
represents less than ¯ve percent of the totals in both years, while manufacturing and services each account
for about 40 percent of the sample in 1990. For manufacturing, the employment share falls to less than
30 percent in 1997, while rising to 50 percent for services.
Table 1 also reports mean annual wages for selected demographic groups by sector and year, along with
employment shares within sector. On average, manufacturing provides the highest level of earnings for
males, and services provides the highest level for females. Males earn an unconditional wage premium in
6all sectors and years. Table 1 also indicates that workers with some college education earn a substantial
unconditional premium in all sectors and years. The same holds true for workers in white collar occupations
(professional and managerial, technical and supervisory, and other white collar), except for commerce in
1997, where wages across the two occupation groupings are nearly equal. Males make up the bulk of
workers in agriculture and manufacturing, while females account for a substantial proportion of employment
in commerce and services. Outside of services, the vast majority of workers have no college education. Blue
collar occupations predominate in agriculture and manufacturing, and white collar occupations comprise
most of employment in commerce and services. Appendix D provides complete lists with summary
statistics of RAIS variables used in the paper.
Firm data. For the ¯rm-level data, we use the manufacturing survey PIA (Pesquisa Industrial Anual
from IBGE, the Brazilian census bureau) for 1990 and 1997. The data are a random sample of all but the
smallest manufacturing ¯rms. PIA includes a wide range of input, output and performance measures.9
IBGE's publication rules allow data from PIA to be withdrawn in the form of tabulations of cells
having at least three ¯rms. We construct cells using three-¯rm random combinations drawn from within
each N¶ ³vel 50 sector, calendar year and location (metropolitan S~ ao Paulo city or rural). The N¶ ³vel 50
sectors consist of 31 manufacturing sectors, corresponding roughly to the two-digit SIC sectors in the
U.S. A single four- or ¯ve-¯rm cell is de¯ned within a sector when the number of ¯rms in the sector is
not divisible by three. For each three-to-¯ve-¯rm cell, we calculate the number of ¯rms as well as the
sum, mean, and standard deviation of the relevant PIA variables. While the observations are aggregated,
we retain the ¯rm identi¯ers behind each newly-created composite observation, permitting the linking of
RAIS workers to the composite observations. This procedure yields samples of 1,169 and 679 linked cells
for 1990 and 1997, respectively. We provide details on the linking in Appendix B.
Complementary household survey data. The widely used Brazilian household survey PNAD (Pes-
quisa Nacional por Amostra de Domic¶ ³lios) provides separate and complementary information on informal
7and formal employment. We relegate a discussion of PNAD variable de¯nitions, and a brief comparison
with RAIS, to Appendix C.
II Statistical Models
Individual wages. The availability of establishment information in our worker data set allows us to
include an establishment variable in our wage regressions. Following Abowd et al. (2001), we model
individual compensation in a given year as
lnwi = xi¯ + ÃJ(i) + "i; (1)
where wi is worker i's annual wage, xi is a vector of observable worker characteristics including gender,
experience, education and occupation, ¯ is a vector of parameters to be estimated, ÃJ(i) is an establishment
e®ect (j = J(i) being the establishment that employs worker i), and "i is an error term. The establishment
e®ect combines a pure establishment e®ect with the establishment average of pure worker e®ects:
Ãj = Áj + ®j; (2)
where Áj is the pure establishment e®ect and ®j is the average of pure worker e®ects ®i over workers
employed at establishment j. The establishment e®ect controls for unobservable worker and establishment
characteristics. Abowd and Kramarz (1999) show that omitting this e®ect leads to bias in the estimation
of ¯ in general.
Selectivity. Informal employment is not covered in RAIS. To remove potential bias from formal work
status selectivity in (1), we assess work status selection based on identical worker characteristics xi mea-
sured in the household data. We model selection as
h(xi;µ) + ´i > 0 i® worker i is formally employed, (3)
where µ is a parameter vector. The coe±cient vectors ¯ and µ are estimated under two sets of structural
assumptions. First, we assume joint normality of the errors "i and ´i. Second, under the assumption
8that h(xi;µ) is a nonlinear function of xi, contrary to xi¯, we estimate an analog to the nonparametric
Das, Newey and Vella (2003) model.
Firm characteristics. For the ¯rm-level analysis, the predicted wage component due to worker charac-
teristics, xib ¯, as well as the predicted establishment-¯xed component, b Ãj, are linked to ¯rms and aggregated
to ¯rm-level averages b Ãk and xkb ¯. We then relate these ¯rm-level components of individual compensation
to ¯rm-level variables qk according to
qk = b Ãk°1 + (xkb ¯)°2 + !S(k) + ºk; (4)
where °1 and °2 are parameters to be estimated, !s is a sector e®ect, s = S(k) is the N¶ ³vel 50 manufacturing
sector in which ¯rm k operates, and ºk is an error term.
III Individual Wage Structure in Manufacturing
Our speci¯cation of the individual compensation model (1) uses potential worker experience and indicator
variables for gender, education and occupation as measures of individual characteristics. Quadratic, cubic
and quartic terms for potential experience are included. Gender is interacted with all other variables.
Table 2 presents results for the manufacturing sector in 1990 and 1997. Comparable estimates for man-
ufacturing workers in France in 1992 and the U.S. in 1990, drawn from Abowd et al. (2001), are also
reported.10
Wages and worker characteristics in Brazil. To facilitate the interpretation of earnings components,
Table 3 summarizes the wage di®erentials for education, occupation and gender implied by Table 2 esti-
mates. As regards education, Brazilian manufacturing workers with some college education earn almost
twice as much on average as high school graduates, and college graduates earn two-and-a-half times as
much. The pro¯les of education di®erentials for men and women display striking similarity, and change
little between 1990 and 1997.
9With respect to occupations, relative wages in Brazil rise for both men and women as occupations
increase in skill intensity. Professional and managerial workers, for example, earn over twice as much as
non-skill-intensive blue collar workers. The pro¯le is steeper for men. Male skill-intensive blue collar
workers earn a premium of nearly 30 percent relative to their non-skill-intensive blue collar counterparts,
while among women the wages of all blue collar workers are roughly similar. Di®erences in the occupational
returns between 1990 and 1997 are very small.
Figure 1 displays average wages by years of experience for male and female workers, as derived from
the Table 2 estimates. For both sexes, wages in Brazilian manufacturing rise with experience throughout
the range of years considered, with returns to experience being much higher for males but relatively less
steep in 1997 than in 1990.11
Comparison with France and the U.S. Our wage structure estimates for Brazil can be directly
contrasted with the ¯ndings of Abowd et al. (2001) for France and the U.S., given the comparability
of our variable de¯nitions and econometric speci¯cation. Figure 1 and Table 3 report the estimated
experience-wage pro¯les and education, occupation and gender di®erentials for all three countries. For
men, the experience pro¯le is steeper in Brazil than in the U.S., and much steeper than in France. A
similar pattern holds with respect to education premia, where the returns to college for Brazilian men are
dramatically higher than for either French or American men. In general, measured returns to human
capital acquisition by men are highest in Brazil and lowest in France.
Women present a di®erent picture. As Figure 1 shows, the experience pro¯le for Brazilian women is
much °atter than for men. Returns to experience for women in Brazil are below those in the U.S., while
still being above those in France. Thus, while women earn lower compensation for experience relative
to men in all three countries, the gap is far larger in Brazil. Similar to France and the U.S., women
receive higher college premia in Brazil than men. Excepting the relatively small earnings increase from
primary school to high school education for women in manufacturing, women realize higher returns to
human capital acquisition relative to men in all three countries.
10The results also reveal a striking similarity between occupation di®erentials in Brazil and France for
both sexes. For Brazil, the male occupation pro¯le by skill is slightly steeper than for France, while the
female occupation pro¯les in Brazil and France are very similar in 1990 and close in 1997. U.S. occupation
premia are much lower and exhibit a larger wage premium for skill-intensive blue-collar occupations than
for other (non-skill-intensive) white collar occupations.
The remaining gender gap in wages|conditional on experience, education and occupation di®erences
between genders|is less pronounced in Brazil than in France and closer to U.S. manufacturing. The
overall Brazilian female/male wage ratio of around 90 percent lies very near the U.S. ¯gure and markedly
above the level of 80 percent in France.
In summary, Brazil's earnings pattern in manufacturing resembles that of the U.S. more closely in
experience, education and gender, while occupational premia in Brazil and France are quite similar.
Components of individual wages. We next assess the overall explanatory power of the estimated
worker characteristics and establishment-¯xed components of individual wages, given by xib ¯ and b Ãj,
respectively. The worker characteristics component represents the predicted wages of a worker with
observed characteristics xi, conditioning on his or her place of work. As discussed above, the estab-
lishment-¯xed component captures both establishment-average pure worker e®ects and pure establishment
e®ects, so it re°ects predicted wages based on the establishment mean of unobserved worker characteristics
together with unobserved establishment characteristics. Finally, the residual component of wages captures
worker-level wage determinants that remain after controlling for worker characteristics and establishment-
¯xed e®ects. To ensure comparability with Abowd et al. (2001), we exclude education variables and
compute wage components from a re-estimated model.12 As a consequence, the e®ect of education on
wages is subsumed into the residual component.
Table 4 assesses the importance of the two components in explaining wages. Column (1) of the table
reports the means of log wages and the two wage components for the three countries expressed in 1990 U.S.
dollars, and for Brazil in 1997 expressed in 1997 U.S. dollars. Standard deviations are given in column
11(2), and the remaining columns indicate simple correlations between log wages, the wage components and
the regression residuals. Observe that the standard deviation of log wages for Brazil in 1990 exceeds that
of France and the U.S. by 90 percent and 44 percent, respectively, indicating substantially greater earnings
inequality in Brazil.
In all three countries, the predicted wages of workers based on their observable characteristics play an
important role in determining total compensation. For Brazil, the variability of the worker characteristics
components in 1990 and 1997, measured by standard deviation, amounts to 62.5 percent and 56.7 percent,
respectively, of the variability of log wages. Comparable ¯gures for France and the U.S. are 65.1 percent
and 49.8 percent. Moreover, worker characteristics have high explanatory power, as exhibited by the high
correlations between the worker characteristics components and log wages across the four cases. Arguably,
these ¯gures understate the importance of worker characteristics, since education has been subsumed into
the residual component.
In contrast, the establishment-¯xed component is much less important for Brazil. The variability of
this component amounts to 25.9 percent of total wage variability in 1990, and 34.3 percent in 1997. The
corresponding percentages for France and the U.S. are 41.6 and 48.9, respectively. The establishment-
¯xed component also has lower explanatory power in Brazil, as indicated by the relatively low correlations
between the components and log wages in Brazil (.358 and .435) versus France and the U.S. (.581 and
.610). Unmeasured characteristics at the establishment level appear to explain substantially less of the
variation in log wages in Brazil relative to France and the U.S.13
Comparing the establishment-¯xed components shows the extent to which establishment-level factors
can explain the relatively greater earnings inequality in Brazil. Importantly, the standard deviations of
the Brazilian establishment-¯xed components in 1990 and 1997 (.203 and .267) are closely comparable
in magnitude to the corresponding values for France and the U.S. (.172 and .266). Thus, explanatory
variables based on establishment cannot account for the di®erences in overall wage variability. We return
to the importance of this ¯nding in the discussion in Section VII.
Finally, the two wage components considered jointly have lower explanatory power in Brazil. Comparing
12the goodness of ¯t R2 (within) values in Table 2 relative to France and the U.S., Brazilian wages display
much greater unexplained variability.
Decomposition of wage inequality. We inquire further as to how the establishment-¯xed and worker
characteristics components contribute to log wage inequality in Brazilian manufacturing.14 The individ-
ual earnings model (1) decomposes log wages into mutually exclusive additive components. Shorrocks
(1982) shows that, under plausible invariance axioms, the unique decomposition of any inequality index is
proportional to the additive decomposition of the squared coe±cient of variation.15
Table 5 reports the Shorrocks (1982) decomposition of log annual wage inequality into its components.
For this purpose, we include education in the wage regressions. Worker characteristics account for around
half of wage inequality in both years. The unexplained residual in log wages, however, accounts for almost
as much of log wage inequality as do observed worker characteristics.
Recall that the estimated establishment-¯xed e®ect combines a pure establishment e®ect with the
establishment average of pure worker e®ects. This combined establishment-¯xed e®ect accounts for only
about 10 percent of total log wage inequality. Omitting the establishment-¯xed e®ect in straight OLS
regressions induces a slight increase in the contribution of worker characteristics to log wage inequality of
around three percentage points. This e®ect is tiny, and the estimates of returns to experience and eduction,
the premia on occupations, and the gender di®erential hardly change when establishment-¯xed e®ects are
removed.16 The establishment-¯xed e®ect reduces the residual component in log wage inequality, and
accounts for no more than a ¯fth of otherwise unexplained residual variability. So, unobserved worker
heterogeneity is behind the bulk of unexplained earnings inequality in Brazil.
IV Formal Work Status Selectivity
Selection into formality. In the Brazilian manufacturing sector, informal workers constitute 22 and
35 percent of the workforce in 1990 and 1997, respectively. We inspect whether selection of workers into
formal work status a®ects estimates of the individual earnings model (1) for Brazil. For this purpose, we
13make use of the PNAD household data. Occupational reporting is less reliable in the household data, so we
only discern between blue and white-collar jobs. To improve ¯t, we distinguish nine levels of educational
attainment. The categories are identically de¯ned in the PNAD household and the RAIS labor force
data.
Let selection into formal employment be modelled as in (3): worker i is formally employed i® h(xi;µ)+
´i > 0. Conditional on presence in the RAIS census, expected compensation (1) becomes
E[lnwi jIi = 1;xi] = xi¯ + ÃJ(i) + E["i jh(xi;µ)>¡´i]; (5)
where Ii = 1 indicates formal status. We use regressors xi common to both the household and RAIS data
sets for prediction of h(xi;µ) in RAIS, based on household-data estimates of µ. Two sets of structural
assumptions are considered.17
First, in the spirit of Heckman's (1979) two-stage parametric procedure, we estimate formality selection
using a probit model on the household data. The errors "i and ´i are assumed to be jointly normally
distributed, and we adopt the simpli¯cation h(xi;µ) = xiµ. The selection probability is given by the
cumulative normal distribution at xiµ, P(Ii = 1jxi) = ©(xiµ). It follows that ¯ in (5) is identi¯ed, and
the least squares estimator is unbiased, after inclusion of the predicted inverse of Mills' ratio as regressor
(Heckman 1979).
To implement the parametric procedure, we ¯rst obtain estimates of the selection coe±cients µ for
1990 and 1997 from PNAD, using PNAD variables that coincide with RAIS variables. We ¯nd that the
probability of formal work status signi¯cantly increases with education and experience, while occupation
and gender have no statistically signi¯cant e®ect. We take the coe±cient estimates for an out-of-sample
prediction of the inverse of Mills' ratio for every worker in the RAIS census of formal employment. Finally,
we include the predicted inverse of Mills' ratio in our individual compensation model (5) to gauge the
bearing of formality selection on the compensation estimates.
Table 6 reveals that returns to education, occupation premia, and gender di®erences, for both 1990
and 1997, are essentially una®ected by the parametric correction (columns 1 and 2, as well as 4 and 5).18
14Findings are similar for experience premia and components of individual wages.
Second, as a further robustness check, we make the alternative assumption that h(xi;µ) is a nonlinear
function of xi, whereas xi¯ involves no higher-order interactions, and estimate the so-restricted semipara-
metric analog to the nonparametric Das et al. (2003) model.19 In particular, we estimate the propensity
score of formality status with a polynomial expansion of continuous variables up to fourth order and the full
set of indicator variable interactions (excluding the blue-collar indicator from higher-order interactions).20
In the compensation equation, we use the propensity score and its square (which are both statistically
signi¯cant) to approximate the non-zero disturbance expectation.
As seen in Table 6, the semiparametric correction has only a tiny e®ect on estimated returns to
education, occupation premia, and gender di®erences for both years. The experience premia and wage
components are similarly una®ected. We conclude that our ¯ndings are robust to formal-sector selectivity.
Wage e®ects of formality selection. Under the parametric Heckman (1979) correction, the coe±cients
on the inverse Mills' ratio capture the covariance between the error term in the selection equation and
the error term in the individual compensation model. Our RAIS estimates are ¡:259 in 1990 and ¡:137
in 1997, with standard errors of .122 and .037, respectively. These negative and statistically signi¯cant
correlations between the two error terms indicate that workers whose unobserved characteristics raise the
probability of informal employment receive higher wage compensation in their formal jobs, all else equal.
In other words, the informal sector exerts a slight upward pressure on formal-job wages for workers who
are more likely to ¯nd employment in the informal sector.
V Wage Components and Firm Characteristics
We draw on the linked RAIS-PIA sample to relate the ¯rm-average worker characteristics and estab-
lishment-¯xed components of individual wages to the characteristics of manufacturing ¯rms. The ¯rm
characteristics model (4) estimates partial correlations between selected ¯rm characteristics and the two
wage components. This allows us to assess what may be predicted about ¯rm characteristics from one
15wage component, controlling for the other component. We consider ¯ve measures of inputs and three
measures of productivity at the ¯rm level, corresponding to the variables analyzed by Abowd et al. (2001).
Results for Brazil in 1990 and 1997, along with France in 1992 and the U.S. in 1990, are reported in Table
7.
As seen in column (1) of Table 7, the size of Brazilian manufacturing ¯rms, measured in terms of
total employment, exhibits a mild positive correlation with both of the wage components in 1990. An
increase of one percent in the characteristics-predicted wage levels of a ¯rm's workers, holding constant
the predicted wages of its establishments, is associated with a nearly 1.2 percent increase in ¯rm size,
while a one percent increase in the predicted wage levels of a ¯rm's establishments, holding constant its
characteristics-predicted worker wages, implies an increase in size that approaches 1.5 percent. Both ¯rm-
average wage components relate positively with total capital stock, with the wage elasticities of capital
stock being in excess of two percent. Correspondingly, high-wage manufacturing ¯rms, measured with
respect to either of the wage components, tend to be more capital intensive.
Comparing Brazil to France, the correlations of employment and capital stock with the worker char-
acteristics component of wages are quite similar, but employment and capital stock have much stronger
positive correlations with the establishment-¯xed component in France. Controlling for predicted wages
due to average worker characteristics, ¯rms with high-wage establishments are much more likely to be large
and capital intensive in France. For the U.S., in contrast, high predicted worker wages are associated with
smaller ¯rms, and the relationship with capital intensity is only slightly positive. The establishment-¯xed
component relates positively to ¯rm size and capital stock in the U.S., but the partial correlations are much
smaller than in Brazil and France. Thus, the link between input characteristics and the wage structure
of ¯rms, particularly as predicted by average worker characteristics, di®ers sharply between Brazil and
France, on one hand, and the U.S., on the other.
The link between wage components and occupational structure is considered in two ways, consistent
with the di®ering French and U.S. measures used by Abowd et al. (2001). The variable \High-Skill
Occupation Ratio" (corresponding to the French measure) is de¯ned as professional and managerial plus
16technical and supervisory employment, divided by total employment, using the skill categories from RAIS.
The \Non-Production Worker Ratio," in contrast, divides the ratio of white collar workers by the sum
of white and blue collar workers, where the data are drawn from PIA. Across occupation variables and
countries, occupational skill intensity relates positively to predicted worker wages, as expected. The
association between skill intensity and predicted establishment wages is positive for Brazil, but much
smaller for the other countries, suggesting that the establishment-¯xed earnings component in Brazil is
more responsive to work force composition.
Worker productivity, based on either value added per employee or sales per employee, exhibits positive
correlation with both wage components in all three countries. In Brazil, ¯rms with high values of either
wage component are especially likely to have highly productive workers, as measured by value added. The
relationship is much weaker with respect to the sales measure, however. The two productivity measures
produce nearly identical results for France and the U.S., with the relationship being more strongly positive
in France. The results do not establish any signi¯cant relationship between return on capital and the wage
components in any of the countries. Productivity gains for ¯rms with high-wage workers or high-wage
establishments appear to o®set the higher wage costs.
Finally, the estimated relationships for 1997 are broadly consistent with those of 1990, with the excep-
tion that the relationships between wage components and the capital stock variables become signi¯cantly
smaller in 1997.
VI Sectoral Comparisons
The sectoral scope of RAIS permits a wage analysis beyond manufacturing. Table 8 presents regression
results for four sectors in 1990 (note that column (1) of Table 8 reproduces the results for Brazilian
manufacturing reported in Table 2). We use the complete regression speci¯cation, including the education
variable, in computing the wage components. We choose the year 1990 for sectoral comparisons.21
17Wages and worker characteristics. The pro¯les of experience premia for men and women in 1990
are shown in Figure 2. Experience pro¯les in services and commerce for both sexes are close to each
other, but below those in manufacturing for males while above those in manufacturing for females. The
experience pro¯les are the lowest in agriculture for both sexes. Table 9 does not reveal major discrepencies
in education, occupation and gender di®erentials across sectors. Thus, our basic ¯ndings concerning the
relation between wages and worker characteristics hold across the four sectors. There are, however,
some di®erences worth noting. Table 9 shows that returns to education are somewhat lower in the
non-manufacturing sectors, save for college-educated men in commerce and agriculture.
Occupational premia exhibit interesting cross-sectoral di®erences. For services, the technical and
supervisory occupations receive wages that are closer to professional and managerial levels than in other
sectors. For commerce, in contrast, the occupation pro¯le is relatively °at up to the professional and
managerial level, where it takes a sharp upward jump. At the other end of the scale, skill-intensive blue
collar occupations receive substantial premia for men in manufacturing and commerce, and for women in
services.
Components of individual wages. Table 10 evaluates the explanatory power of the predicted worker
characteristics and establishment-¯xed components of wages across sectors. Total wage variability in man-
ufacturing and services exceeds that in commerce and especially in agriculture. Except for agriculture,
the sectors remain highly unequal relative to the manufacturing sectors in France and the U.S. The stan-
dard deviations of the worker characteristics and establishment-¯xed components relative to the standard
deviation of log wages are roughly comparable in manufacturing, services, and commerce, as are the cor-
relations between the two components and log wages. Thus, for these three sectors, worker characteristics
play a much greater role in explaining wages than do establishment-¯xed components. This ¯nding does
not extend to agriculture, where the establishment-¯xed component is equally important in terms of both
relative variability and correlation with wages.
18Decomposition of wage inequality. Table 11 reports components of log annual wage inequality in
1990 across sectors. Worker characteristics account for 50 percent of log wage variation in manufacturing
but predict a considerably smaller portion of the variability in non-manufacturing sectors, ranging from 35
percent in services to 26 percent in agriculture. Individual components among the worker characteristics
matter to di®erent degrees across sectors. Most notably, the commerce sector exhibits only negligible
gender inequality.
In parallel with our ¯ndings on wage components, the establishment-¯xed components in manufac-
turing, services and commerce account for comparably small proportions of wage inequality, while this
component is much more important in agriculture. For services and commerce, the smaller role of the
worker-characteristics component is tied to the greater importance of the residual component. Note that
the overall explanatory power of observed worker characteristics and the establishment ¯xed e®ect, as
measured by the goodness of ¯t R2, is considerably lower in services, commerce, and agriculture than
in manufacturing (Table 8). This corresponds to the lower overall explanatory power of the individual
compensation model (1) for these sectors.
VII Discussion
Broad comparisons. Our analysis uncovers a rich pattern of di®erences and similarities between the
wage structures of Brazil, France and the U.S. The most noticable di®erences are the familiar ones: both
wage inequality and returns to education are much greater in Brazil. More surprising are the similarities.
Brazil and France exhibit closely comparable occupational premia, and the compensation of workers based
on their observable characteristics relates in a similar way to ¯rm size, capital intensity and skill intensity.
In the U.S., occupational premia are considerably smaller, and the relationships between wages and ¯rm
attributes are weaker. On the other hand, returns to human capital are lowest in France, and the gender
gap is greatest.
High levels of wage inequality in developing versus industrialized countries are of great concern to
19economists and policymakers. These di®erences are especially pronounced for the case of Brazil. Our
results o®er insights into the factors underlying high Brazilian wage inequality. Wage variability based on
observable worker characteristics, as a percentage of overall wage variability, is roughly equivalent across
the three countries. Moreover, the correlation of log wages with the worker characteristics component of
wages is highest in Brazil. These ¯ndings indicate that much of the di®erence in wage inequality can be
traced to compensation of workers based on their observable characteristics.
The picture is strikingly di®erent with respect to the establishment-speci¯c component of wages, con-
trolling for worker characteristics. Variability of wages at the establishment level, in absolute terms, is
roughly equal across the three countries, meaning that establishment-level factors explain a much smaller
percentage of Brazilian inequality compared with the other countries. Thus, factors operating at the
establishment level cannot account for the greater wage inequality observed in Brazil. The relatively weak
correlation between log wages and the establishment component of wages in Brazil further highlight the
low explanatory power of establishment-level in°uences.
Institutional factors. Institutional comparisons across the three countries o®er a measure of insight into
these ¯ndings. Labor markets are heavily regulated in Brazil and France, and much less regulated in the
U.S. Botero, Djankov, La Porta, Lopez de Silanes and Shleifer (2004), for example, place France among the
countries with the highest index of employment regulation, while Brazil occupies an intermediate position,
and the U.S. belongs to the group of countries with few laws governing the cost of working times, dismissal
procedures, and similar labor-market characteristics. The countries are equivalently ordered with respect
to collective relations legislation, with French laws greatly in°uencing the negotiations between ¯rms and
unions, and the U.S. relegating the bargaining process to the private sector.
As Botero et al. (2004) argue, similarities between Brazil and France might be traceable to the fact that
the Brazilian legislation derives from the French Civil law, which spread to the rest of Europe through the
Napoleonic conquest, and was then brought to Brazil via Portuguese colonization. In addition, Brazil's
1988 Constitution introduced a series of reforms to labor market institutions that aimed to increase workers'
20bene¯ts and the right to organize, signi¯cantly raising labor costs.22
Our results are suggestive as to the e®ects of labor-market regulation on wages. Regulatory similarities
between Brazil and France are paralleled by similarities in compensation tied to workers' occupations and
characteristics of establishments. Thus, the regulatory environment may be an important determinant of
cross-country di®erences with respect to occupational and establishment-level compensation. Disparities
in returns to human capital between Brazil and France, as well as wage gaps based on gender, may be less
sensitive to regulation. Similarly, regulation may matter less for overall wage variability based on worker
characteristics and residual factors, where Brazil stands closer to the U.S. than to France.
Theoretical implications. Our decomposition of wage variability into worker characteristics and estab-
lishment-¯xed components captures the relative explanatory power of worker-based as opposed to estab-
lishment-based explanatory factors. Notably, observable worker characteristics account for about half
of earnings inequality in Brazilian manufacturing, whereas factors operating at the establishment level,
including those tied directly to the establishment and those related to establishment averages of unmeasured
workforce characteristics, explain roughly ten percent. The remaining forty percent is associated with
unmeasured worker attributes.
These ¯ndings have direct implications for theoretical approaches to wage determination. A wide range
of theories predicts that features of the industry or ¯rm may exert strong in°uences on wage structure,
after taking account of worker characteristics. Such features include compensating di®erentials, e±ciency
wages, rent sharing, unionization, and trade exposure. Theories have also tied ¯rm size and factor intensity,
including worker skill intensity, to the wage structure.23
Since di®erences in wages across industries and ¯rms derive from wage variability among constituent
establishments, our decomposition implies that these employer-related theories can account for at most a
tenth of overall wage variability. In addition, since Brazil, France and the U.S. exhibit roughly equivalent
establishment-level wage variability in absolute terms, employer-based theories cannot account for the high
degree of inequality in Brazil relative to the other countries.
21Competitive labor-market theories predict that worker attributes command equal compensation across
establishments. Observed attributes, including human capital, occupation and gender, explain roughly
half of Brazilian wage inequality, while unobserved attributes account for two-¯fths. These unobserved
attributes may include intrinsic ability, school quality, family background, geographic mobility, and un-
measured determinants of health and education investment.24 Cross-country di®erences in residual wage
inequality may be quite sensitive to such worker-related factors.
In summary, our ¯ndings suggest that labor-supply factors warrant the most attention among the
explanations for high wage inequality. Labor-demand factors deserve less attention, since their potential
explanatory power is limited. For future research into compensation variation, expanded information
about worker attributes, including social and geographic factors, would appear to have great potential for
enhancing the understanding of wage structure.
VIII Conclusion
Using a comprehensive linked employer-employee data set for a developing country, we provide estimates
for key elements of the Brazilian wage structure that permit direct comparisons with estimates of Abowd
et al. (2001) for France and the U.S. We con¯rm some familiar di®erences, but notably uncover numerous
important similarities, particularly for Brazil and France. Our most important ¯nding is that Brazil's
high wage inequality cannot be explained by factors operating at the ¯rm or industry level. Explanations
must be sought in the characteristics of workers, both observable and unobservable.
Beyond our purpose of contrasting Brazil's wage structure with other countries, an extension of our
data and methods to periods before and after Brazil's pro-competitive reforms may prove useful for un-
derstanding the e®ects of Brazil's policy shifts. Numerous studies have tracked the e®ects of Brazil's
trade reform on wages, for instance.25 The availability of linked RAIS data allows wage e®ects to be
separated into worker and establishment in°uences, and workers to be traced across jobs. Menezes and
Muendler (2006) consider implications of trade for employment °ows using RAIS and ¯nd that Brazil's
22tari® reductions signi¯cantly accelerate worker transitions out of the formal sector, while exporting ¯rms
and comparative-advantage sectors fail to absorb displaced workers for several years. Extending this
investigation to wage e®ects of trade would be of interest. Evidence in this paper suggests that impacts




Screening. Workers in RAIS are identi¯ed by the individual-speci¯c PIS number (Programa de Inte-
gra» c~ ao Social). A given establishment may report the same PIS multiple times within a single year so
that the worker can withdraw from the employer-funded severance pay account (FGTS) through spuri-
ous layo®s and rehires. Bad compliance can cause certain PIS numbers to be recorded incorrectly or
repeatedly. To handle these issues, we screen the sample as follows. (1) Observations with faulty PIS
numbers (having fewer than 11 digits) are eliminated. We suspect short PIS numbers to be due to faulty
bookkeeping. (2) As mentioned in the text, observations with workers not employed on December 31st are
removed; only the worker's job observation on December 31st with the highest annual average wage level
is retained (in cases of ties, we randomly drop all but one job observation per worker on Dec 31st). This
makes our sample comparable to Abowd et al. (2001), who consider full-time and full-year employees. (3)
Observations of workers older than 50 years are dropped to avoid potential confounding e®ects stemming
from workers who leave the labor force prior to o±cial retirement age.
Compensation. RAIS de¯nes the average monthly wage as the arithmetic mean of all monthly remu-
nerations for a given worker, divided by the value of the minimum wage that prevails during the respective
month. In this conversion, RAIS counts only the months, or parts thereof, during which the workers are
employed, excluding the \thirteenth salary," which is a special December payment made in some sectors.
Months with missing wage information are disregarded in the calculation of this mean.
The RAIS manual for respondents states explicitly the forms of payment that are considered valid
components of the monthly wage rate. Among other components, these include: salaries; extraordinary
additions, supplements and bonuses; tips and gratuities; commissions and fees; contracted premia; overtime
compensation for contracted extra hours; hazard compensation; executive compensation; cost reimburse-
24ment components if they exceed 50 percent of the base salary and are for travel or transfers necessary for
the execution of the job; payments for periods of vacation, holidays and parental leave; vacation gratuities
if they exceed 20 days of salary; piece wages; and in-kind remunerations such as room and board. As a
rule, components are considered part of salary if they are taxable income or are subject to Brazilian social
security contributions.
Payments that are not considered wage components include: severance payments for layo®s; indemnity
payments for permanent maternal leave and any other indemnity payments; so-called \family payments"
under Brazilian labor law; vacation gratuities if they do not exceed 20 days of salary; additional social
security compensation due to a worker's illness; moving expenses; travel cost reimbursements if they do not
exceed 50 percent of the base salary; scholarships for interns; meals, equipment and clothing for execution
of the job; and participation in the employer's pro¯ts.
Experience, education and occupation. The following tables present age and education classi¯ca-
tions from RAIS, along with the imputed ages used in construction of the potential experience variable.
We use the age range information in our version of RAIS to infer the \typical" age of a worker in the age
range as follows:
RAIS Age Category Imputed Age
1. Child (10-14) 12
2. Youth (15-17) 16
3. Adolescent (18-24) 21
4. Nascent Career (25-29) 27
5. Early Career (30-39) 34.5
6. Peak Career (40-49) 44.5
7. Late Career (50-64) excluded
8. Post Retirement (65-) excluded
We group age information in PNAD into the same categories and also ignore workers of age 50 and older.
25To calculate potential labor force experience, we use the following inference schedule to impute the
worker's age at the completion of his/her education for both RAIS and PNAD data:
Imputed Age
RAIS Education Category at completion
1. Illiterate 6
2. Primary School Dropout 7
3. Primary School Graduate 10
4. Middle School Dropout 11
5. Middle School Graduate 14
6. High School Dropout 15
7. High School Graduate 18
8. College Dropout 19
9. College Graduate 22
The preceding table also shows how we translate years of education in PNAD into the RAIS education
categories.
Following Abowd et al. (2001), we de¯ne potential labor market experience for a worker as the imputed
age for his/her age category minus the imputed age for his/her education category.
The occupation indicator variables are obtained from the CBO classi¯cation codes in the RAIS, as
reclassi¯ed to conform with the ISCO-88 categories (Muendler et al. 2004). Before we convert CBO
to ISCO-88, we reset unknown CBO codes in RAIS at the four-digit level to the nearest applicable
miscellaneous occupation category at the four-digit level. The mapping between ISCO-88 categories and
occupation levels is given as follows:
26ISCO-88 Category Occupation Level
1. Legislators, senior o±cials, and managers Professional & Managerial
2. Professionals Professional & Managerial
3. Technicians and associate professionals Technical & Supervisory
4. Clerks Other White Collar
5. Service workers and shop and market sales workers Other White Collar
6. Skilled agricultural and ¯shery workers Skill Intensive Blue Collar
7. Craft and related workers Skill Intensive Blue Collar
8. Plant and machine operators and assemblers Skill Intensive Blue Collar
9. Elementary occupations Other Blue Collar
Finally, we de¯ne the education indicator variables as follows:
RAIS Education
Education Level Categories
1. Primary School (or less)
26 1-3
2. Some High School 4-7
3. Some College 8
4. College 9
B Firm data
Table 12 describes the link between RAIS establishments and PIA ¯rms. For the year 1990, we can link
2,864 out of 58,192 establishments in S~ ao Paulo state to the PIA ¯rm sample. In 1997, only 1,689 out of
62,969 establishments in S~ ao Paulo state can be identi¯ed in the PIA ¯rm sample. In order to withdraw
micro-level data from PIA at the Brazilian census bureau IBGE, we randomly tabulate cells of three (to
¯ve) ¯rms. Some so-created cells contain ¯rms for which do not have RAIS observations or for which we
cannot predict establishment-level information within RAIS. Our random aggregation routine leaves some
PIA ¯rms unassigned to cells in certain years in order to create random cells of three ¯rms that appear
possibly many consecutive years during other periods between 1990 and 1998. For both reasons, we lose
further ¯rms.
27C Complementary household survey data
We use Pesquisa Nacional por Amostra de Domic¶ ³lios (PNAD) to observe formally and informally em-
ployed workers in S~ ao Paulo state in September 1990 and September 1997. We exclude both unemployed
persons and employers, and obtain 13,665 PNAD household-level observations of workers in 1990 and
14,414 observations in 1997. Similar to our procedure for December wages in RAIS, we convert Septem-
ber wages in PNAD ¯rst to December values in Brazilian currency (using the Brazilian CPI ¶ Indice Nacional
de Pre» cos ao Consumidor, INPC) and then into current U.S. dollars.27
The PNAD household data permit the distinction between formal employment (with a labor ID card
carteira) and informal employment (without labor ID card). Informal employment is recorded in PNAD if
it entails at least four paid hours per week. The labor ID card entitles workers to employment protection
and social bene¯ts, largely borne by the employer.
D Summary Statistics
Tables 13 and 14 provide sample means and standard deviations of worker-sample variables.
28Notes
1Abowd, Kramarz and Margolis (1999) and Arai (2003) show for France and Sweden that substantial
person-¯xed and, to a lesser degree, employer-¯xed e®ects account for wage dispersion. Postel Vinay and
Robin (2002) decompose wage variation across workers further by occupation and ¯nd that the portion of
cross-sectional wage variance explained by person-¯xed e®ects is close to 40 percent for high-skilled white
collar workers but quickly drops to zero with decreasing skill intensity of the job. Abowd and Kramarz
(1999) survey other recent work in this area.
2Linked employer-employee data sets exist for Algeria (Chennouf, Levy and Montmarquette 1997),
Zimbabwe (Velenchik 1997), Guatemala (Funkhouser 1998), Peru (Scha®ner 1998), Morocco and Tunisia
(Destre and Nordman 2002), Slovenia (Haltiwanger and Vodopivec 2003), Colombia (as mentioned in
Abowd, Haltiwanger and Lane 2004), Bulgaria (Dobbelaere 2004), and Mexico (Kaplan, Martinez Gonzalez
and Robertson 2005). Few data exhibit as rich a set of variables and as comprehensive employer and
employee coverage as does RAIS in Brazil. Using RAIS, Mizala and Romaguera (1998) draw a random
sample of 12,580 workers from 172 S~ ao Paulo state manufacturing ¯rms in 1987.
3In 1990, the Collor administration initiated trade reforms, which involved the removal of widespread
non-tari® barriers and the imposition of a new tari® structure. Implementation of these policies was
largely completed by 1993. During the Franco administration in 1994, drastic anti-in°ation measures
succeeded for the ¯rst time in decades. A privatization program for public utilities was started in 1991
and accelerated in the mid 1990s.
4Brazil exhibits considerable economic diversity across states, so that it can be problematic to consider
average labor-market outcomes for the country as a whole. 41% of Brazil's manufacturing value added in
the 1990s originated in S~ ao Paulo state, making the state highly representative of Brazilian manufacturing
overall. S~ ao Paulo state is home to 22% of the Brazilian population and a third of all formal sector
workers.
5We inspect whether selection of Brazilian workers into formal employment induces a detectable bias
29in the log wage component estimates for Brazil. Under the assumption of jointly normally distributed
formality selection disturbances and log wage residuals, we ¯nd no such evidence.
6RAIS primarily provides information to a federal wage supplement program (Abono Salarial), by
which every worker with formal employment during the calendar year receives the equivalent of a monthly
minimum wage. RAIS records are then shared across government agencies. An employer's failure to
report complete workforce information can, in principle, result in ¯nes proportional to the workforce size,
but ¯nes are rarely issued. In practice, workers and employers have strong incentives to ascertain complete
RAIS records because payment of the annual public wage supplement is exclusively based on RAIS. The
ministry of labor estimates that well above 90 percent of all formally employed workers in Brazil are
covered in RAIS throughout the 1990s. Data collection is typically concluded by March following the
year of observation.
7The correspondence is imprecise in only one respect: the French and U.S. data allow Abowd et al.
(2001) to distinguish between undergraduate and graduate degree attainment, while the RAIS combines
these two categories. Our education indicator variables therefore distinguish four levels of schooling.
\College Graduate" corresponds to the \Completed College" and \Completed Post-Graduate Degree"
levels in Abowd et al. (2001).
8Brazil's CBO-94 generally provides classi¯cations at a ¯ner level of detail than does ISCO-88. The
level of detail in the Brazilian system permits the reclassi¯cations needed for transforming the more
profession-based Brazilian classi¯cations into the more skill-based international classi¯cations. For a
small number of 1990 observations, RAIS includes CBO codes that are not used in CBO-94. We set these
to \Miscellaneous" within the relevant subcategory.
9In PIA (Pesquisa Industrial Anual), the Brazilian statistical bureau IBGE surveys mining and man-
ufacturing ¯rms for the years 1986 to 1990, and from 1992 to present. We use observations for the years
1990 and 1997. In 1986, a ¯rm quali¯ed for PIA if at least half of its revenues stemmed from mining
or manufacturing activity, and the starting sample was taken from three strata. (1) The population of
the roughly 800 largest Brazilian manufacturers with sales in 1985 corresponding to at least 200 million
301995-BRL (1995-USD). (2) A random sample of medium-size ¯rms with annual output in 1985 above
100,000 1995-BRL. More than 6,900 ¯rms make it into PIA this way. (3) The non-random selection of
newly founded ¯rms with annual average employment of at least 100 persons. Around 1,800 such entrants
are included in PIA until 1993. A ¯rm that enters PIA through one of these three strata remains in the
sample until legal extinction. Any a±liate, spin-o®, or ¯rm otherwise related to a sample ¯rm enters PIA.
Sampling changes in 1996 to represent all mining and manufacturing ¯rms with more than 10 employees,
but no capital stock ¯gures are reported since. Therefore, the data set of this paper only includes ¯rms in
1997 that are also present in PIA in at least one year prior to 1996. Their capital stock is inferred with a
perpetual inventory method.
10Data for France derive from the Enqu^ ete sur la Structure des Salaires (ESS), which samples responses
to an annual administrative census of business enterprises. Data for the U.S. derive from the Worker-
Establishment Characteristic Database (WECD), which links individual census responses to manufacturing
establishments surveyed in the Longitudinal Research Database (LRD). See Abowd et al. (2001) for further
details.
11Arbache (2001) stresses the stability of Brazilian wage structure in micro data despite a series of policy
reforms. We con¯rm stability of manufacturing wages between 1990 and 1997 for returns to education
and for occupation premia, but not for returns to experience.
12The samples for France in 1990 and the U.S. used by Abowd et al. (2001) distinguish college and
post graduate education, while our Brazilian data combine all college graduates into a single category.
So we cannot directly compare estimated individual characteristics components across the samples unless
education is excluded. For France and the U.S., we report the results from Abowd et al. (2001) that use
the speci¯cations excluding education.
13These results are broadly consistent with the general ¯nding that worker e®ects dominate ¯rm e®ects
in explaining wages. Abowd and Kramarz (1999) provide a review of the numerous studies establishing
the relative importance of worker e®ects.
14Fishlow (1972) and subsequent studies investigate sources of income inequality in Brazil by demo-
31graphic group; our focus lies on the estimated earnings components.
15The squared coe±cient of variation is an inequality index in the generalized entropy family and equals
two times the generalized entropy measure of degree two.
16Velenchik (1997) for Zimbabwe and Funkhouser (1998) for Guatemala also report only a small bias
when employer-¯xed e®ects are omitted.
17The regressor sets xi in (1) and in the selection condition h(xi;µ) + ´i > 0 coincide unless there
are worker characteristics that predict formality, but do not correlate with compensation. We have no
evidence for the existence of such instruments.
18In a similar vein, Carneiro and Henley (1998) ¯nd no signi¯cant bearing of the informal sector's size
on Brazilian real wages in a short-term model of wage determination.
19In our application, identi¯cation requires restricting the parametric part of the compensation equation
to lower-order interactions. This introduces potential speci¯cation error. We thus view our semipara-
metric version of the Das et al. (2003) model merely as a robustness check of Heckman (1979) correction.
20Leave-one-out cross validation shows this polynomial expansion to exhibit superior ¯t, with an average
squared prediction error up to six percent below lower-order approximations and four percent below the
minimum-error speci¯cation with blue-collar indicators. We choose polynomial estimation after ¯nding
the semiparametric Klein and Spady (1993) estimator to exhibit problematic convergence behavior.
21Results do not markedly di®er between 1990 and 1997, except for declining returns to experience in
the manufacturing sector, which we discussed in section III, and a widening gender gap in the services
sector between 1990 and 1997.
22The 1988 reforms reduced the maximum working hours per week from 48 to 44, increased the minimum
overtime premium from 20% to 50%, reduced the maximum number of hours in a continuous shift from 8
to 6 hours, increased maternity leave from 3 to 4 months, increased the value of paid vacations from 1 to
4/3 of the normal monthly wage, and increased the ¯ne for an unjusti¯ed dismissal from 10% to 40% of
the employer-funded severance pay account (FGTS). See Heckman and Pag¶ es (2004) and Gonzaga (2003)
for further details.
3223Rosen (1986) discusses compensating di®erentials. Links between trade and wage structure in Brazil
are assessed in Gonzaga, Menezes Filho and Terra (2006). Arbache (2001) and Velenchik (1997) provide
brief overviews of the literature on other industry- and ¯rm-based explanatory factors.
24Willis (1986) surveys competitive theories of wage determination based on worker attributes. On
school quality and family background, see Behrman and Birdsall (1983) and Lam and Schoeni (1993),
respectively. Other factors are discussed in Behrman (1999).
25In 1990, the Brazilian government broke with the country's import substitution strategy and embarked
on drastic trade liberalization. Gonzaga et al. (2006), for example, show that the decline in education
premia in the early 1990s was consistent with predictions of the classic Heckscher-Ohlin model. Arbache,
Dickerson and Green (2004) do not detect a statistically signi¯cant e®ect of trade liberalization on inter-
industry wage di®erentials in manufacturing, which remain remarkably stable over the 1980s and 1990s.
Both papers use household data.
26Including illiterates.
27While INPC in°ation was 59.4 percent between September and December 1990, the exchange rate
devalued by 101.9 percent over the same period. To avoid distortions from exchange rate °uctuations in
our comparisons, we ¯rst transform PNAD September wages to December values using the Brazilian CPI
INPC.
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Sources: RAIS S~ ao Paulo state manufacturing 1990 and 1997 (prime age workers in their highest-
paying job), Abowd et al. (2001) for France 1992 and the U.S. 1990. Wage levels relative to zero
experience wage levels from wage component estimates (Table 2). Calculations for France 1992
and the U.S. 1990 based on Abowd et al.'s (2001) estimates and summary statistics.
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Source: RAIS S~ ao Paulo state 1990 (prime age workers in their highest-paying job). Wage levels
relative to zero experience wage levels from wage component estimates (Table 8).
Figure 2: Potential experience in Brazil 1990, by sector
38Table 1: Mean Log Wages and Employment Shares
Mean Log Wage Employment Shares
Manuf Servcs Comm Agric Manuf Servcs Comm Agric
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Sector Year:
1990 8.016 7.953 7.461 7.352 .398 .433 .151 .018
1997 8.872 8.797 8.406 8.056 .288 .500 .171 .041
Education 1990:
Some college or more 9.014 8.589 8.261 8.146 .093 .217 .070 .027
High school or less 7.913 7.776 7.400 7.330 .907 .783 .930 .973
1997:
Some college or more 9.891 9.462 9.202 9.128 .103 .225 .069 .022
High school or less 8.754 8.604 8.347 8.032 .897 .775 .931 .978
Occupation 1990:
White collar 8.469 8.124 7.503 7.718 .292 .660 .679 .131
Blue collar 7.829 7.620 7.372 7.297 .708 .340 .321 .869
1997:
White collar 9.288 8.923 8.420 8.727 .293 .720 .685 .092
Blue collar 8.699 8.475 8.377 7.988 .707 .280 .315 .908
Gender 1990:
Male 8.174 8.040 7.549 7.421 .728 .558 .648 .802
Female 7.593 7.842 7.299 7.073 .272 .442 .352 .198
1997:
Male 8.987 8.881 8.469 8.094 .744 .520 .625 .844
Female 8.536 8.706 8.301 7.854 .256 .480 .375 .156
Source: RAIS S~ ao Paulo state 1990 and 1997 (prime age workers in their highest-paying job). Wages in current USD
(1990 and 1997 exchange rates). The log U.S. CPI change between 1990 and 1997 is .187.
39Table 2: Manufacturing Wages in Brazil, France and the U.S.
Brazil 1990 Brazil 1997 France 1992 U.S. 1990
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Primary School Education (or less) -1.075 -1.000 -.338 -.526
(.002) (.002) (.009) (.008)
Some High School Education -.923 -.881 -.256 -.404
(.002) (.002) (.009) (.007)
Some College Education -.339 -.316 -.200 -.334
(.003) (.003) (.009) (.007)
College Graduate -.064 -.123
(.016) (.007)
Professional or Managerial Occupation .856 .912 .760 .359
(.002) (.002) (.009) (.004)
Technical or Supervisory Occupation .600 .632 .401 .206
(.002) (.002) (.007) (.004)
Other White Collar Occupation .262 .249 .169 -.039
(.002) (.002) (.011) (.005)
Skill Intensive Blue Collar Occupation .239 .225 .155 .083
(.001) (.001) (.007) (.003)
Potential Labor Force Experience .095 .082 .069 .083
(.0005) (.0007) (.003) (.002)
Quadratic Experience Term -.003 -.003 -.004 -.003
(.00005) (.00007) (.0002) (.0001)
Cubic Experience Term .00005 .00008 .0001 .00007
(2.29e-06) (2.86e-06) (1.00e-05)
Quartic Experience Term -3.01e-07 -7.64e-07 -1.20e-06 -4.70e-07
(3.24e-08) (3.89e-08) (1.00e-07) (3.00e-08)
Female .060 .070 .052 -.078
(.005) (.006) (.024) (.019)
Female £ Primary School Education (or less) .106 .051 -.0006 .041
(.004) (.004) (.021) (.016)
Female £ Some High School Education -.016 -.058 -.016 -.009
(.004) (.004) (.021) (.015)
Female £ Some College Education .018 -.005 .025 -.019
(.005) (.005) (.021) (.015)
Female £ College Graduate -.062 -.022
(.029) (.015)
Female £ Professional or Managerial Occupation -.101 -.058 -.049 -.086
(.004) (.005) (.016) (.007)
Female £ Technical or Supervisory Occupation -.173 -.250 -.006 .037
(.003) (.004) (.011) (.008)
Female £ Other White Collar Occupation .088 .071 .033 .046
(.003) (.003) (.013) (.006)
Female £ Skill Intensive Blue Collar Occupation -.208 -.167 -.045 -.043
(.002) (.003) (.010) (.008)
Female £ Potential Labor Force Experience -.056 -.036 -.047 -.016
(.0008) (.001) (.004) (.003)
Female £ Quadratic Experience Term .002 .002 .004 .0003
(.0001) (.0001) (.0003) (.0002)
Female £ Cubic Experience Term -.00006 -.00005 -.0001 .00000
(4.35e-06) (5.63e-06) (1.00e-05)
Female £ Quartic Experience Term 7.06e-07 5.40e-07 1.20e-06 1.80e-08
(6.32e-08) (7.78e-08) (1.10e-07) (4.00e-08)
R
2 (within) .508 .468 .817 .617
Residual degrees of freedom 2,326,428 1,828,049 23,920 148,992
Sources: RAIS S~ ao Paulo state manufacturing 1990 and 1997 (prime age workers in their highest-paying job), Abowd et al.
(2001) for France and the U.S., controlling for establishment ¯xed e®ects. Estimates for Brazil relative to college graduates, for
France and the U.S. relative to workers with post-graduate degree. Standard errors in parentheses (insigni¯cant point estimates at
the ¯ve percent level in italics).
40Table 3: Relative Manufacturing Wages in Brazil, France and the U.S.
Brazil 1990 Brazil 1997 France 1992 U.S. 1990
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Education28
Male worker:
College Degree 2.516 2.412 1.376 1.693
Some College 1.793 1.758 1.057 1.073
Primary School (or less) .859 .888 .920 .885
Female worker:
College Degree 2.556 2.556 1.488 1.746
Some College 1.855 1.854 1.101 1.062
Primary School (or less) .970 .990 .935 .930
Occupation29
Male worker:
Professional or Managerial 2.355 2.488 2.139 1.432
Technical or Supervisory 1.821 1.882 1.493 1.228
Other White Collar 1.299 1.283 1.184 .962
Skill-intensive Blue Collar 1.270 1.252 1.168 1.087
Female worker:
Professional or Managerial 2.128 2.348 2.037 1.313
Technical or Supervisory 1.532 1.466 1.484 1.275
Other White Collar 1.419 1.377 1.224 1.006
Skill-intensive Blue Collar 1.031 1.059 1.116 1.041
Gender30
Female worker .893 .915 .803 .899
Sources: RAIS S~ ao Paulo state manufacturing 1990 and 1997 (prime age workers in their highest-paying job), Abowd et
al. (2001) for France 1992 and the U.S. 1990. Wage levels relative to comparison-group wage levels from component estimates
(Table 2). For France and the U.S., wage prediction of college graduates reassigned to predicted ¯xed e®ects component.
Table 4: Variability of Manufacturing Wages in Brazil, France and the U.S. Correlation with
Mean St.Dev. lnwi xib ¯ b Ãj b "i
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Brazil 1990
Log Annual Wage (lnwi) 8.019 .785 1.000
Worker Characteristics (xib ¯) .962 .491 .667 1.000
Establishment-Fixed (b Ãj) 7.056 .203 .358 .160 1.000
Residual (b "i) .000 .550 .700 .000 -.000 1.000
Brazil 1997
Log Annual Wage (lnwi) 8.872 .778 1.000
Worker Characteristics (xib ¯) .878 .441 .622 1.000
Establishment-Fixed (b Ãj) 7.994 .267 .435 .161 1.000
Residual (b "i) -.000 .549 .705 -.000 -.000 1.000
France 199231
Log Annual Wage (lnwi) 10.158 .414 1.000
Worker Characteristics (xib ¯) .637 .287 .791 1.000
Establishment-Fixed (b Ãj) 9.521 .172 .581 .237 1.000
Residual (b "i) .000 .190 .457 -.003 .000 1.000
U.S. 1990
Log Annual Wage (lnwi) 10.174 .544 1.000
Worker Characteristics (xib ¯) .672 .271 .598 1.000
Establishment-Fixed (b Ãj) 9.502 .266 .610 .242 1.000
Residual (b "i) .000 .350 .627 -.029 .000 1.000
Sources: RAIS S~ ao Paulo state manufacturing 1990 and 1997 (prime age workers in their highest-paying job), Abowd
et al. (2001) for France 1992 and the U.S. 1990. Estimates for all three countries from establishment-¯xed e®ects wage
regressions relative to other blue-collar occupations, not controlling for education to achieve comparability (not reported).
Statistics based on estimation sample. The log U.S. CPI change between 1990 and 1997 is .187.
41Table 5: Components of Manufacturing Log Wage Inequality
1990 1997
FE32 OLS33 FEa OLSb
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Worker Characteristics (xib ¯) .501 .529 .445 .484
Experience .158 .170 .110 .121
Occupation .137 .139 .139 .141
Education .134 .140 .145 .161
Gender .072 .080 .051 .061
Establishment-Fixed E®ect (b Ãj)34 .081 .131
Residual (b "i) .418 .471 .424 .516
Source: RAIS S~ ao Paulo state manufacturing 1990 and 1997 (prime age workers in their highest-paying job). Underlying
inequality index: squared coe±cient of deviation (Shorrocks 1982), based on estimation samples.
Table 6: Relative Manufacturing Wages in Brazil under Selectivity
RAIS 1990 (FE) RAIS 1997 (FE)
No corr. Param. Semip. No corr. Param. Semip.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Education35
Male worker:
College Degree 2.516 2.494 2.516 2.412 2.386 2.412
Some College 1.793 1.795 1.793 1.758 1.766 1.758
Primary School (or less) .859 .881 .859 .888 .901 .888
Female worker:
College Degree 2.556 2.504 2.555 2.556 2.488 2.547
Some College 1.855 1.794 1.854 1.854 1.812 1.848
Primary School (or less) .970 .974 .969 .990 .996 .984
Occupation36
Male worker:
Profess'l or Managerial 2.355 2.370 2.355 2.488 2.493 2.488
Technical or Superv. 1.821 1.836 1.821 1.882 1.887 1.882
Other White Collar 1.299 1.310 1.299 1.283 1.285 1.283
Skill-int. Blue Collar 1.270 1.269 1.270 1.252 1.252 1.252
Female worker:
Profess'l or Managerial 2.128 2.065 2.129 2.348 2.341 2.349
Technical or Superv. 1.532 1.486 1.533 1.466 1.460 1.467
Other White Collar 1.419 1.376 1.419 1.377 1.372 1.378
Skill-int. Blue Collar 1.031 1.029 1.031 1.059 1.059 1.059
Gender37
Female worker .893 .901 .893 .915 .917 .915
Source: RAIS (prime age workers in their highest-paying job) S~ ao Paulo state manufacturing, 1990 and 1997. Out-
of-sample selectivity predictions of formality status from PNAD (prime age household members in September) coe±cient
estimates. Wage levels relative to comparison-group wage levels from component estimates.
42Table 7: Manufacturing Firm Characteristics and Wages in Brazil, France and the U.S.
Brazil 1990 Brazil 1997 France 1992 U.S. 1990
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Log Employment
38
Mean Worker Characteristics (xk b ¯) 1.111 .783 1.103 -.486
(.141) (.144) (.402) (.130)
Mean Establishment-Fixed ( b Ãk) 1.496 1.716 4.588 .223
(.187) (.172) (.495) (.073)
Log Capital Stock
Mean Worker Characteristics (xk b ¯) 2.336 .841 2.290 -.183
(.207) (.185) (.510) (.154)
Mean Establishment-Fixed ( b Ãk) 2.403 1.703 6.751 .838
(.274) (.219) (.628) (.086)
Log Capital-Labor Ratio
Mean Worker Characteristics (xk b ¯) 1.244 .337 1.187 .303
(.121) (.149) (.200) (.060)
Mean Establishment-Fixed ( b Ãk) .920 .104 2.163 .615
(.160) (.177) (.247) (.034)
Non-Production Worker Ratio
a
Mean Worker Characteristics (xk b ¯) .052 .055 .124
(.016) (.019) (.014)




Mean Worker Characteristics (xk b ¯) .441 .507 .572
(.021) (.025) (.031)
Mean Establishment-Fixed ( b Ãk) .279 .121 .041
(.028) (.030) (.036)
Log Value Added per Employee
Mean Worker Characteristics (xk b ¯) 6.556 -.183 .818 .252
(1.260) (1.578) (.084) (.036)
Mean Establishment-Fixed ( b Ãk) 4.485 5.449 1.157 .453
(1.668) (1.889) (.103) (.020)
Log Sales per Employee
Mean Worker Characteristics (xk b ¯) .488 .547 .930 .343
(.069) (.095) (.152) (.044)
Mean Establishment-Fixed ( b Ãk) .264 .354 1.428 .505
(.092) (.113) (.186) (.025)
Return on Capital
Mean Worker Characteristics (xk b ¯) -1.329 .170 -.084 -.003
(1.107) (.105) (.020) (.048)
Mean Establishment-Fixed ( b Ãk) -1.124 .003 .098 -.205
(1.462) (.125) (.025) (.027)
Sources: S~ ao Paulo state manufacturing ¯rms in PIA and RAIS on December 31, 1990 and 1997. Abowd et al. (2001) for
France 1992 and the U.S. 1990. Partial correlations from individual regressions on mean worker characteristics (xk b ¯) and mean
establishment e®ects (b Ãk), controlling for sector-¯xed e®ects. Standard errors in parentheses (insigni¯cant point estimates at the
¯ve percent level in italics).
43Table 8: Wage Structure in Brazil 1990, by Sector
Manufact. Services Commerce Agriculture
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Primary School Education (or less) -1.075 -.948 -1.229 -1.247
(.002) (.002) (.005) (.014)
Some High School Education -.923 -.848 -1.115 -1.061
(.002) (.002) (.005) (.014)
Some College Education -.339 -.303 -.374 -.518
(.003) (.003) (.007) (.022)
Professional or Managerial Occupation .856 .623 .654 .467
(.002) (.002) (.004) (.008)
Technical or Supervisory Occupation .600 .497 .221 .343
(.002) (.002) (.002) (.011)
Other White Collar Occupation .262 .237 .090 .130
(.002) (.002) (.002) (.008)
Skill Intensive Blue Collar Occupation .239 .314 .171 -.065
(.001) (.002) (.002) (.004)
Potential Labor Force Experience .095 .081 .065 .060
(.0005) (.0006) (.0006) (.002)
Quadratic Experience Term -.003 -.003 -.001 -.002
(.00005) (.00007) (.00008) (.0002)
Cubic Experience Term .00005 .00005 -.00003 .00003
(2.29e-06) (2.92e-06) (3.89e-06) (8.60e-06)
Quartic Experience Term -3.01e-07 -3.17e-07 7.35e-07 -3.31e-07
(3.24e-08) (4.06e-08) (5.83e-08) (1.21e-07)
Female .060 -.255 -.388 -.438
(.005) (.004) (.009) (.031)
Female £ Primary School Education (or less) .106 .215 .397 .394
(.004) (.003) (.008) (.029)
Female £ Some High School Education -.016 .130 .326 .256
(.004) (.003) (.008) (.030)
Female £ Some College Education .018 .080 .175 .099
(.005) (.004) (.010) (.041)
Female £ Professional or Managerial Occupation -.101 .116 -.062 .147
(.004) (.003) (.007) (.026)
Female £ Technical or Supervisory Occupation -.173 .053 -.028 .092
(.003) (.003) (.004) (.021)
Female £ Other White Collar Occupation .088 .151 .122 .193
(.003) (.002) (.004) (.015)
Female £ Skill Intensive Blue Collar Occupation -.208 -.160 -.083 .044
(.002) (.004) (.006) (.009)
Female £ Potential Labor Force Experience -.056 -.038 -.029 -.034
(.0008) (.001) (.001) (.004)
Female £ Quadratic Experience Term .002 .002 .0007 .0007
(.0001) (.0001) (.0001) (.0004)
Female £ Cubic Experience Term -.00006 -.00004 7.72e-06 -1.15e-06
(4.35e-06) (4.66e-06) (6.72e-06) (.00002)
Female £ Quartic Experience Term 7.06e-07 4.10e-07 -3.75e-07 3.39e-08
(6.32e-08) (6.43e-08) (1.01e-07) (2.52e-07)
Observations 2,330,883 2,530,777 876,164 107,641
R
2 (within) .508 .367 .320 .322
Source: RAIS S~ ao Paulo state 1990 (prime age workers in their highest-paying job), controlling for establishment-worker ¯xed
e®ects (manufacturing Table 2). Standard errors in parentheses (insigni¯cant point estimates at the ¯ve percent level in italics).
44Table 9: Relative Wages in Brazil by Sector
Manufact. Services Commerce Agriculture
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Education40
Male worker:
College Degree 2.516 2.334 3.049 2.890
Some College 1.793 1.724 2.097 1.721
Primary School .859 .905 .892 .830
Female worker:
College Degree 2.556 2.051 2.201 2.237
Some College 1.855 1.641 1.803 1.470
Primary School .970 .986 .957 .953
Occupation41
Male worker:
Profess'l or Managerial 2.355 1.864 1.923 1.596
Technical or Supervisory 1.821 1.643 1.247 1.409
Other White Collar 1.299 1.267 1.094 1.139
Skill-intensive Blue Collar 1.270 1.370 1.187 .938
Female worker:
Profess'l or Managerial 2.128 2.094 1.807 1.848
Technical or Supervisory 1.532 1.733 1.212 1.545
Other White Collar 1.419 1.474 1.235 1.382
Skill-intensive Blue Collar 1.031 1.167 1.092 .979
Gender42
Female worker .893 .879 .925 .941
Source: Source: RAIS S~ ao Paulo state 1990s (prime age workers in their highest-paying job). Wage levels relative to
comparison-group wage levels from component estimates (Table 8).
Table 10: Wage Variability in Brazil 1990, by Sector
Correlation with
Mean St.Dev. lnwi xib ¯ b Ãj b "i
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Manufacturing 1990
Log Annual Wage (lnwi) 8.019 .785 1.000
Worker Characteristics (xib ¯) .056 .541 .727 1.000
Establishment-Fixed (b Ãj) 7.963 .183 .346 .163 1.000
Residual (b "i) .000 .508 .647 .000 -.000 1.000
Services 1990
Log Annual Wage (lnwi) 7.956 .830 1.000
Worker Characteristics (xib ¯) .177 .480 .600 1.000
Establishment-Fixed (b Ãj) 7.779 .335 .436 .054 1.000
Residual (b "i) -.000 .573 .691 .000 .000 1.000
Commerce 1990
Log Annual Wage (lnwi) 7.464 .742 1.000
Worker Characteristics (xib ¯) -.476 .403 .573 1.000
Establishment-Fixed (b Ãj) 7.939 .214 .345 .105 1.000
Residual (b "i) .000 .571 .768 -.000 -.000 1.000
Agriculture 1990
Log Annual Wage (lnwi) 7.355 .584 1.000
Worker Characteristics (xib ¯) -.795 .300 .507 1.000
Establishment-Fixed (b Ãj) 8.150 .295 .499 -.012 1.000
Residual (b "i) .000 .407 .698 -.000 .000 1.000
Source: RAIS S~ ao Paulo state 1990 (prime age workers in their highest-paying job). Estimates from establishment-¯xed
e®ects wage regressions in Table 8. Statistics based on estimation sample.
45Table 11: Components of Log Wage Inequality 1990, by Sector
Manufacturing Services Commerce Agriculture
FE OLS FE OLS FE OLS FE OLS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Worker Char. (xib ¯) .501 .529 .347 .374 .311 .329 .261 .264
Experience .158 .170 .059 .066 .138 .148 .067 .072
Occupation .137 .139 .104 .105 .064 .064 .065 .057
Education .134 .140 .174 .193 .105 .115 .085 .089
Gender .072 .080 .010 .011 .003 .002 .043 .046
Establishm.-Fixed (b Ãj)43 .081 .176 .099 .252
Residual (b "i) .418 .471 .477 .626 .590 .671 .487 .736
Source: RAIS S~ ao Paulo state 1990 (prime age workers in their highest-paying job). Inequality index: squared coe±cient
of deviation (Shorrocks 1982), based on estimation samples.
Table 12: Matches between RAIS and PIA Random Firm Tabulations
Data Source Frequency Percent Cumulated
1990:
RAIS and PIA ¯rms
RAIS-SP establishments but no PIA ¯rm 281,685 97.69 97.69
PIA ¯rms but no RAIS-SP establishment 3,056 1.06 98.75
RAIS-SP establishments in PIA ¯rms 3,616 1.25 100.00
Total 288,357 100.00
Randomly tabulated three-¯rm cells
RAIS & PIA ¯rms but no cell match 724 37.05 37.05
Cells but no RAIS & PIA match 61 3.12 40.17
Cells matched with RAIS & PIA 1,169 59.83 100.00
Total 1,954 100.00
1997:
RAIS and PIA ¯rms
RAIS-SP establishments but no PIA ¯rm 376,719 99.04 99.04
PIA ¯rms but no RAIS-SP establishment 1,511 0.40 99.43
RAIS-SP establishments in PIA ¯rms 2,158 0.57 100.00
Total 380,388 100.00
Randomly tabulated three-¯rm cells
RAIS & PIA ¯rms but no cell match 305 28.21 28.21
Cells but no RAIS & PIA match 97 8.97 37.19
Cells matched with RAIS & PIA 679 62.81 100.00
Total 1,081 100.00
Sources: S~ ao Paulo state manufacturing ¯rms in PIA and RAIS on December 31, 1990 and 1997.
46Table 13: Summary Statistics, RAIS Manufacturing 1990 and 1997
Manufact. 1990 Manufact. 1997
Mean St.Dev. Mean St.Dev.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Log Annual Wage44 8.016 .786 8.872 .778
Primary School Education (or less)45 .533 .499 .487 .500
Some High School Education .373 .484 .409 .492
Some College Education .034 .182 .037 .190
College Graduate .053 .225 .066 .248
Professional or Managerial Occupation .079 .270 .072 .259
Technical or Supervisory Occupation .096 .294 .081 .273
Other White Collar Occupation .117 .321 .140 .347
Skill Intensive Blue Collar Occupation .551 .497 .589 .492
Low-skill Intensive Blue Collar Occupation .157 .364 .117 .322
Potential Labor Force Experience 16.079 9.458 17.252 9.144
Quadratic Experience Term 3.480 3.374 3.813 3.406
Cubic Experience Term 8.653 11.352 9.575 11.696
Quartic Experience Term 23.492 38.335 26.140 40.007
Tenure at establishment .923 1.106 1.012 1.176
Female .272 .445 .256 .436
Female £ Log Annual Wage 2.062 3.393 2.181 3.738
Female £ Primary School Education (or less) .140 .347 .123 .328
Female £ Some High School Education .106 .308 .102 .303
Female £ Some College Education .010 .101 .011 .105
Female £ College Graduate .013 .114 .019 .137
Female £ Professional or Managerial Occupation .014 .118 .015 .122
Female £ Technical or Supervisory Occupation .027 .163 .022 .147
Female £ Other White Collar Occupation .042 .201 .058 .234
Female £ Skill Intensive Blue Collar Occupation .140 .347 .128 .334
Female £ Low-skill Intensive Blue Collar Occupation .048 .215 .033 .178
Female £ Potential Labor Force Experience 3.828 7.904 4.134 8.388
Female £ Quadratic Experience Term .771 2.060 .874 2.216
Female £ Cubic Experience Term 1.833 6.110 2.127 6.614
Female £ Quartic Experience Term 4.837 19.379 5.677 21.063
Female £ Tenure at establishment .187 .542 .214 .613
Observations 2,364,007 1,837,461
47Table 14: Summary Statistics, RAIS 1990
Manufact. 1990 Services 1990
Mean St.Dev. Mean St.Dev.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Log Annual Wage46 8.016 .786 7.953 .830
Primary School Education (or less)47 .533 .499 .545 .498
Some High School Education .373 .484 .237 .425
Some College Education .034 .182 .063 .242
College Graduate .053 .225 .147 .354
Professional or Managerial Occupation .079 .270 .224 .417
Technical or Supervisory Occupation .096 .294 .155 .362
Other White Collar Occupation .117 .321 .279 .448
Skill Intensive Blue Collar Occupation .551 .497 .140 .346
Low-skill Intensive Blue Collar Occupation .157 .364 .203 .402
Potential Labor Force Experience 16.079 9.458 17.137 9.283
Quadratic Experience Term (=100) 3.480 3.374 3.798 3.462
Cubic Experience Term (=1;000) 8.653 11.352 9.594 11.987
Quartic Experience Term (=10;000) 23.492 38.335 26.414 41.364
Tenure at establishment .923 1.106 1.047 1.240
Female .272 .445 .442 .497
Female £ Log Annual Wage 2.062 3.393 3.469 3.930
Female £ Primary School Education (or less)b .140 .347 .232 .422
Female £ Some High School Education .106 .308 .086 .280
Female £ Some College Education .010 .101 .033 .179
Female £ College Graduate .013 .114 .088 .283
Female £ Professional or Managerial Occupation .014 .118 .130 .336
Female £ Technical or Supervisory Occupation .027 .163 .088 .283
Female £ Other White Collar Occupation .042 .201 .126 .332
Female £ Skill Intensive Blue Collar Occupation .140 .347 .012 .107
Female £ Low-skill Intensive Blue Collar Occupation .048 .215 .087 .282
Female £ Potential Labor Force Experience 3.828 7.904 7.642 10.563
Female £ Quadratic Experience Term (=100) .771 2.060 1.700 3.003
Female £ Cubic Experience Term (=1;000) 1.833 6.110 4.307 9.428
Female £ Quartic Experience Term (=10;000) 4.837 19.379 11.909 31.123
Female £ Tenure at establishment .187 .542 .496 .987
Observations 2,364,007 2,585,223
48Table 14: Summary Statistics, RAIS 1990, cont'd
Commerce 1990 Agriculture 1990
Mean St.Dev. Mean St.Dev.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Log Annual Wage48 7.461 .742 7.352 .584
Primary School Education (or less)49 .479 .500 .802 .399
Some High School Education .450 .497 .171 .377
Some College Education .028 .165 .008 .089
College Graduate .031 .173 .013 .115
Professional or Managerial Occupation .061 .240 .043 .203
Technical or Supervisory Occupation .328 .469 .026 .158
Other White Collar Occupation .288 .453 .062 .240
Skill Intensive Blue Collar Occupation .166 .372 .689 .463
Low-skill Intensive Blue Collar Occupation .156 .363 .180 .385
Potential Labor Force Experience 13.206 9.348 16.163 9.833
Quadratic Experience Term (=100) 2.618 3.047 3.579 3.639
Cubic Experience Term (=1;000) 6.153 9.872 9.227 12.568
Quartic Experience Term (=10;000) 16.139 32.721 26.051 43.426
Tenure at establishment .512 .699 .600 .808
Female .352 .478 .199 .399
Female £ Log Annual Wage 2.569 3.506 1.401 2.826
Female £ Primary School Education (or less)b .165 .371 .161 .368
Female £ Some High School Education .160 .366 .030 .170
Female £ Some College Education .012 .107 .003 .055
Female £ College Graduate .012 .108 .003 .057
Female £ Professional or Managerial Occupation .017 .131 .004 .060
Female £ Technical or Supervisory Occupation .139 .346 .008 .091
Female £ Other White Collar Occupation .136 .342 .022 .147
Female £ Skill Intensive Blue Collar Occupation .015 .123 .132 .339
Female £ Low-skill Intensive Blue Collar Occupation .045 .207 .033 .178
Female £ Potential Labor Force Experience 4.281 7.873 3.118 7.704
Female £ Quadratic Experience Term (=100) .803 2.006 .691 2.158
Female £ Cubic Experience Term (=1;000) 1.819 5.940 1.795 6.811
Female £ Quartic Experience Term (=10;000) 4.670 18.965 5.134 22.808
Female £ Tenure at establishment .165 .435 .096 .342
Observations 894,885 109,786
49